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Abstract: Over the past 50 years, policy makers have sought to shape new and emerging technologies
in light of societal risks, public values, and ethical concerns. While much of this work has taken
place during “upstream” research prioritization and “downstream” technology regulation, the actual
“midstream” work of engineers and other technical experts has increasingly been seen as a site for
governing technology in society. This trend towards “socio-technical integration” is reflected in various
governance frameworks such as Sustainable Development (SD), Technology Assessment (TA), and
Responsible Innovation (RI) that are at the center of transformation research. Discussions around
SD, TA, and RI often focus on meso- and macro-level processes and dynamics, with less attention
paid to the qualities of individuals that are needed to support transformation processes. We seek to
highlight the importance of micro-level practices by drawing attention to the virtues of technical experts.
Drawing on empirical study results from embedding philosophical-reflective dialogues within science
and engineering laboratories, we claim that poietic, as well as moral and epistemic, virtues belong to
those required of technical experts who foster integrative practices in transformation research.
Keywords: virtues; transformation research; socio-technical integration; responsible innovation;
engineering practice; interdisciplinary collaboration
1. Introduction
Over the past 50 years, new developments in science and technology have increasingly
been recognized by the public and policy makers as entailing risks, uncertainties, and
concerns. Policy makers have sought to shape new and emerging technologies in light
of such considerations. While much of this work has taken place during “upstream”
research prioritization and “downstream” technology regulation, the actual “midstream”
work of engineers and other technical experts is increasingly seen as a site for governing
technology in society. Accordingly, policy makers have called for an integrated approach
that addresses these considerations [1,2]. Attention to this “socio-technical integration” [3]
is also diversely expressed in governance frameworks such as Sustainable Development
(SD), Technology Assessment (TA), and Responsible Innovation (RI), all of which aim for
societal transformations and offer methodological approaches that support such changes.
However, the exact way in which so-called transformation research should be conducted is
a matter of debate. While some emphasize the need for macro- and meso-level changes,
others focus on the micro-level of technical practices. We propose that multiple levels of
transformation are needed and that a common feature in these debates is the demand
identified by Carl Mitcham of plus respicere [4], i.e., to “take more into account” on the
part of the technical experts who must eventually change their practices as SD, TA, RI
and similar governance frameworks become more widely adopted. This demand of plus
respicere is visible in the development of TA from primarily a parliamentary function
to one that now engages a three-fold constellation of policy makers, members of the
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public and technical experts [5]. It can also be seen in recent demands for “responsible”
developments of technological innovation and the attendant rise of RI [6]. Yet, while
scholars and practitioners have developed numerous collaborative approaches to support
the integration of social and technical considerations during technology development
(e.g., [3]) and to support the goals of the governance frameworks in an integrative fashion.
While notable scholarly attention is devoted to understanding the role that social scientists
and philosophers play in facilitating such collaborations [7–9], far less attention is paid to
understanding the role of technical expertise as a practice in contributing to these goals.
More specifically, understanding the aspects of engineering and related practices that are
helpful or necessary to ensure such integration is a topic that deserves more attention. Such
an understanding is critical for effectively designing, conducting and assessing research
programs and technology projects that are motivated by the aforementioned governance
frameworks and include related integrative components.
In this paper, we build upon philosophy (e.g., [10–20]) and responsible innovation
scholarship (e.g., [21–23]), and take the language of virtues as a means to spell out the
normative aspects of integrated practices of technical experts, showing how this language
applies to integrative efforts in SD, TA, and RI. We conduct a theoretical exposition of the
capacities that are found to be exercised by scientists and engineers who participated in
prior empirical studies. Using three subfields of philosophy, we identify three individual
virtues thought to be consistently present during successful modulations of research and
innovation pathways. Additionally, we argue that each of these three individual virtues
belongs to a separate class of virtues. We thus seek to contribute both to the philosophical
fields of virtue ethics, virtue epistemology, and the philosophy of technology, as well
as to the practical design and assessment of projects and programs intended to bring
about transformation research, which require the (virtuous) participation of scientists and
engineers. Thereby, we argue that such virtue-ethical approaches need to encompass
a broader range of virtue types than is usually included. Importantly, the virtues are
necessary but not sufficient to orient technical experts towards the goals of these governance
frameworks. By necessary, we mean that without these virtues, engineers and other experts
would be in most cases unable to contribute to the goals of the frameworks. According
to our argumentation, the integrative experts must embody different kinds of virtues or
character traits. We thus set out to establish a tripartite theoretical grounding for the virtues
that are empirically observed to be practiced by scientists and engineers who participate in
a coordinated series of studies that investigate capacities for socio-technical integration at
the micro-level [24].
Philosophers identified two kinds of virtues: epistemic and moral virtues. Accordingly,
two philosophical subfields evolved: virtue epistemology and virtue ethics. However, aside
from these two kinds of virtues, there is an overlooked yet important third kind of virtue
that includes such traits as problem-solving competencies, collaboration, and creativity.
These virtues are related to what one achieves in practices of innovating, designing or
producing things, and accordingly we call them “poietic” virtues. The virtue of creativity
is strongly related to innovation and so the link to RI is immediately evident. (One might
ask whether creativity cannot also be regarded as an epistemic virtue. A recent publication
seems to support such a view. Matthew Kieran [25] discusses “epistemic creativity.”
Kieran, however, simultaneously states that not all interpretations of creativity have to
take creativity as epistemic creativity. In this paper, we focus on such an interpretation of
creativity that takes it to be not an epistemic virtue.)
Against the typically narrower focus on moral virtues alone, we stress that the land-
scape of virtues is much broader. The primary claim we advocate in this paper is that
moral, epistemic, and poietic virtues all belong to the required virtues of technical experts
and engineers who participate in the integrative activities and aspirations that governance
frameworks, such as SD, TA, and RI, are concerned with. Additionally, we claim that
it is possible to engage all three kinds of virtues in a way that advances the goals of
transformation research through a philosophical-reflective approach.
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The paper proceeds as follows. First, we present an interpretation of transformation
research in Section 2. Afterwards, in Section 3, an empirical approach in light of this
specific interpretation of transformation research is outlined, the method of Socio-Technical
Integration Research (STIR). In Section 4, we submit theoretical reflections on virtues in light
of the philosophical approaches of virtue epistemology, virtue ethics, and the philosophy
of technology and engineering. The contribution of this paper is the emphasis on the
neglected third category of virtues; therefore, poietic virtues are discussed in Section 5.
A potential objection is raised in Section 6 before the paper concludes in Section 7.
2. Transformation Research
As mentioned above, our interpretation of transformation research applies broadly to
the aforementioned governance frameworks. That said, we begin our discussion of this
topic by taking up and expanding upon a recent contribution to the debate about method-
ologies for sustainability research. Arnim Wiek and Daniel Lang [26] provide a detailed
methodological picture that builds on the idea that transformations have to be promoted
by providing solution options. Wiek and Lang make a distinction between “descriptive-
analytical” and “transformational” forms of sustainability research. They propose to follow
such latter approaches to transformation research. They claim that sustainability research is
better off following the transformational option because this option not only describes the
same sustainability problems as descriptive-analytical approaches, but also creates room
for solutions to these problems. Drawing on Armin Grunwald’s definition of actionable
knowledge [27], Wiek and Lang give three requirements for their proposed interpretation
of transformational research.
Three general methodological requirements apply to transformational sustain-
ability research: first, transformational research needs to apply suitable methods
[ . . . ] that generate [different types of actionable] knowledge as ingredients of
solution options. [ . . . ] [S]econd, transformational sustainability research needs
to employ methodological frameworks that combine different types of methods to
generate such multifaceted actionable knowledge. [ . . . ] [T]hird, transforma-
tional sustainability research is concerned with real-world problems and aims
at actionable knowledge that stakeholders are willing and able to implement.
Therefore, there is broad agreement that such research has to be carried out in
close collaboration between scientists and nonacademic stakeholders from business,
government, and civil society. (p. 33, emphasis in original) [26]
In principle, we agree that Wiek and Lang’s three requirements are necessary for con-
ducting transformation research. Furthermore, we suggest that transformation research can
be conducted in many fields and applies to the various governance frameworks already men-
tioned. Additionally, we wish to expand upon Wiek and Lang’s framework by proposing
a form of research that sits between their two distinctions. This hybrid form of research
is transformational since it accords with their three requirements; but it is also closer to
descriptive-analytical approaches since it entails a form of philosophical reflection that is
largely descriptive and that is pursued primarily to enhance understanding. In that sense, we
expand upon their framework by proposing a third, hybrid form of research that includes
the three requirements for transformational research, but adds a fourth requirement: the
requirement of using philosophically induced reflections in the context of dialogical exchanges.
Such philosophically informed transformation research is, we suggest, a distinct form
of philosophical-reflective approach that can be distinguished from other more intentional
and directed transformational approaches to change groups or societies. (We distinguish
this reflective approach from a more formal philosophical-analytical approach. It is a
question of further research to study how such a philosophical-analytical approach is
similar to or different from the descriptive-analytical approach discussed by Wiek and
Lang.) The philosophical-reflective approach is meant to be a modest proposal that,
nevertheless, opens up the space of possibilities by starting on the micro-level of individual
researchers that can make changes in their methods of research. To do this, we focus
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on empirical examples in which dialogue and reflection are shown to lead to observable
transformations among individual actors, in the next section. We analyze these micro-
level transformations using the philosophical notion of virtues. We show not only that
there are identifiable virtues that underlie recognizable patterns of transformation in
transdisciplinary research, but also that there are different kinds of virtues that correspond
to stages within the patterns. In the end, we seek to contribute to the theory and practice
of transformation research and to highlight the transformational power of philosophical
dialogue, in which reflection itself is a potential resource for change.
3. An Empirical Perspective: STIR and the Virtues
Socio-Technical Integration Research (STIR) was originally developed to identify
and assess opportunities for scientists and engineers to influence science and innovation
decisions in accordance with both scientific norms and societal concerns [28]. A STIR
researcher works with technical experts in their workplace (e.g., a university or industrial
laboratory) and discusses the decisions that they are making “midstream”, i.e., while they
are researching, designing, developing, or procuring technology. STIR inquires into the
nature of science and engineering research decisions that may or may not take socio-ethical
dimensions into account. The immediate goal of the inquiry is not to influence but to assess
the capacity of technical experts to respond to socio-ethical considerations by “modulating”
their material, design, and strategic practices [29].
STIR probes capacities for socio-technical integration (“any activity whereby technical
experts take into account the societal dimensions of their work as an integral part of that
work” [2]) by mapping technical activities in real-time with a “decision protocol” [30]. The
protocol helps structure, guides collaborative inquiry and is comprised of four compo-
nents, each of which corresponds to a particular set of questions, as well as to one of the
four capacities that eventually find expression in the dimensions of a widely recognized
framework of responsible innovation (see Table 1 and also see [31,32]).
Table 1. STIR Decision components and corresponding capacities.
Decision Component Philosophical-Reflective Question Capacity Probed
Opportunity What are you doing? Reflexivity
Considerations Why are you doing it? Inclusion
Alternatives How could you do it? Responsiveness
Outcomes Who might care? Anticipation
The protocol is used to structure regular dialogues (the connections to Socratic di-
alogues and practices are developed in a working paper by Antonio Calleja-Lopez and
Erik Fisher [33]) for a set period [28,30], and the results are qualitatively analyzed using
the midstream modulation analytical framework [24,29,34]. STIR studies have empirically
documented three typical types of modulations: Reflexive learning, value deliberations,
and practical adjustments. Reflexive learning consists of heightened, often metacognitive,
but also affective, awareness of one’s own values and assumptions in relation to others;
value deliberations, in which social, ethical and related concerns are clarified, expanded,
critiqued or reevaluated; and practical adjustments, which consist of incremental material,
strategic or behavioral changes in technical projects, processes, and organizations [35].
Participating technical experts voluntarily choose to enact modulations, rather than
being encouraged, nudged, coerced or otherwise assisted to do so by the STIR researcher.
STIR thereby assesses expert capacities in response to Mitcham’s plus respicere injunction
during their technical work [4], cf. [36,37]. Numerous STIR studies not only document
technical experts “taking more into account” in ways that modulate their technical work,
they also suggest that the dispositions of the experts undergo subtle but meaningful
changes in correlation to the modulations, e.g., [24,30,34,38–43].
In short, each of the three typical results appears to coincide with the exercise of a
specific virtue [44]. Instances of reflexive learning are often conditioned by an increase in
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curiosity about socio-ethical issues or the technical expert’s own roles, identities, practices,
and relations within broader social and ethical systems. Value deliberations tend to be
attended by an increase, not just in curiosity but also in care regarding the stakeholders
involved. Finally, in making practical adjustments, technical experts typically generate and
act upon new ideas to solve problems, suggesting an enhanced creativity.
We now inquire into the status of curiosity, care, and creativity in terms of virtues. In
attempting to understand experts’ capacities to influence science and innovation decisions
and directions in accordance with both scientific norms and socio-ethical concerns, and
building on the results of STIR studies, it seems evident that these three dispositions
of character can be viewed as virtues that are required for any responsible, sustainable,
or alternative form of integrative practice in science and engineering. Without being
curious, one would not be motivated to ask penetrating research questions or identify
underlying problems in the first place. Without some form of care (for others), it is
difficult to imagine experts voluntarily responding to concerns of various stakeholder
groups cf. [23]. Additionally, without being creative, technical experts would not be able
to develop new solutions to identified problems. In short, we suggest that these three
virtues that correspond to midstream modulation sequences are necessary conditions for
integrative micro-level research and innovation practices. Of these three virtues, it seems
clear that curiosity and care signal the presence of epistemic and moral virtues, respectively,
as described by numerous scholars, e.g., [10,11]. What is often overlooked in the literature,
however, is that an additional type of virtue seems to be at work here: poietic virtues, such
as creativity.
4. A Theoretical Perspective: Virtue Epistemology and Virtue Ethics
Three philosophical lines of argument form the basis for the theoretical grounding
of the virtues an integrative expert should possess or cultivate. The first two stem from
established traditions in the philosophical fields of epistemology and ethics, respectively.
The third is the specific contribution of this paper, which can be seen to grow out of recent
discussions in the philosophy of technology and the philosophy of engineering cf. [45,46].
In general, the cultivation of virtues in order to lead a good life is the main theme of any
philosophical approach focusing on virtues. Historically, this discussion of the good life is
already present in discussions of the excellence of persons in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
There, a clear focus on the moral aspects was set, but the virtues were not exclusively
seen as moral virtues. According to Aristotle, there are “ethical” and “dianoetical” virtues.
These virtues are characterized as being either related to the practical or the theoretical
domain of life. One virtue, “phronesis,” has an important function of building a bridge
between the practical and the theoretical domain cf. [12].
(i) Virtue epistemology may provide some support for the first type of virtue, repre-
sented here by the virtue of curiosity: epistemic virtues such as open-mindedness or
intellectual courage seem to be among the required virtues of researchers as they are
important for anybody who is seriously inquiring about a topic. These two examples
of so-called intellectual virtues are not the only virtues discussed in contributions to
epistemology. Nowadays, an important distinction is made between “reliabilist” and
“responsibilist” virtues [13]. The former are cognitive faculties such as good memory
or reasoning skills; the latter are character traits of human beings. Both are oftentimes
conceptualized as competencies of epistemic agents. Additionally, already in Aristo-
tle’s Metaphysics, one finds the insight that human beings are curious by nature [14].
We take curiosity as the most basic epistemic virtue that the technical expert already
has as a human being. Because one has to be curious to start an inquiry, in the first
place, we treat this very general and basic virtue as the prototypical epistemic virtue.
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(ii) Approaches in virtue ethics stress that moral virtues are important for leading a
good life. For instance, Vallor [47] argues for so-called “technomoral” virtues being
important virtues of the 21st century. She not only calls for virtues such as honesty,
courage, and care but also for nine other core technomoral virtues. Vallor presents
a list of twelve virtues that foster human flourishing on a global and local level and
argues that those virtues are needed in order for the human species to survive the
21st century.
(iii) Aside from epistemic and moral virtues, there are other virtues such as problem-
solving competencies, the ability to collaborate and to foster collaborations, and
creativity. These virtues of the potential third kind are related to what one achieves
from a maker’s perspective, and accordingly we call them “poietic” virtues. In a
recent paper, Luciano Floridi [15] argues that “maker’s knowledge” is a category
of knowledge that has been neglected for a long time and that should be put on
the agenda of epistemology again. At one point, he calls it “poietic knowledge,” a
phrase that we take to be suggestive of the poietic virtues we discuss. Floridi argues
that maker’s knowledge is a further category of knowledge, beside knowledge that
something is the case or knowledge of how to do something. In the present paper,
however, we hold that there is a difference in kind between epistemic and poetic
virtues as connected yet distinct modes of human capacity. While not exact, such a
distinction is somewhat analogous to the distinction between formal knowledge and
tacit knowledge.
In the next section we argue that all three virtue types must be exercised in projects
aimed at responsibly and sustainably researching, designing, and developing technologies.
After first focusing on the connection between epistemic and poietic virtues, we turn to the
connection between moral and poietic virtues as our main interest.
5. The Case for Poietic Virtues
5.1. Epistemic and Poietic Virtues
There is a close connection between epistemic and poietic virtues as seen from the
contemporary emphasis on innovation. As engineers and other experts are usually faced
with a demand for novel solutions to technological problems by different types of stake-
holders, they need to be innovative, which includes being creative and many other virtuous
character traits that are required for them to successfully carry out their work. Engineers
have to be not only knowledgeable about the basic theoretical principles and disciplinary
skills, they must also to be able to make and create things, which often involves engaging
in improvisational [48] and other uncertain and “messy” endeavors. Even if there were no
demands for innovating responsibly, they would still have to cultivate these epistemic and
poietic virtues in order to develop solutions to design problems. Therefore, one might ask
whether some of the virtues are already necessary for any innovation project, including
irresponsible ones.
For example, think of Wernher von Braun, the chief engineer of the National Socialists
during World War II who was in charge of the development of the V-2 rocket. Below,
we return to this question of how to deal with potential uses of engineering products for
immoral and socially irresponsible purposes by inviting the reader to imagine two hypo-
thetical engineers—Wernher van Red and Walda van Green—that resemble the historical
engineer, von Braun.
If it would be feasible to neglect the moral perspective, then this might be the case for
poietic virtues such as creativity. However, given that moral values need to be considered
in the context of technological innovation which involves uncertainties and that the luxury
of the so-called value-free ideal [49] often ascribed to scientists cannot be attained by
engineers and other technical experts, it is reasonable to require these researchers to
possess or cultivate moral virtues.
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5.2. Moral and Poietic Virtues
Because technological and innovative endeavors that involve uncertain outcomes
require moral virtues such as care or other character traits of the techno-moral kind, we
argue that it is reasonable to ask for moral and poietic virtues in the context of endeavors
related to governance frameworks such as SD, TA and RI. This is clear from the emphasis in
RI on both the “inclusion” of diverse value considerations and on the “responsiveness” of
innovation processes to such considerations [6]. In short, moral and poietic virtues go hand
in hand in order to innovate responsibly. The poietic virtues are not only closely connected
to epistemic virtues, they are also closely tied to moral virtues. Again, we use the example
of care (for others) as the paradigmatic moral virtue relevant in contexts of innovation. The
question already posed above can be reformulated in terms of this character trait: is care a
necessary condition for orienting towards the goals of the governance frameworks such as
responsible innovation or is it already a necessary condition of any innovation? Building
on others’ arguments [6,50,51], we submit that care is a necessary condition for responsible
innovation, including within micro-level practices. For example, Xavier Pavie [52] argues
that care requires the consideration of “the essential interdependence between the innovator
and the citizen.” Similarly, care for the public safety of a proposed technology is something
engineers and other experts are arguably already ethically (according to codes of conduct),
and in some cases legally, required to exercise. (It is tempting to require care as a necessary
condition for any innovation, but we want to stay uncommitted to this stronger thesis
concerning care and the moral virtues.)
5.3. Wernher van Red and Walda van Green
There is a further case for the poietic virtue of creativity. To discuss this argument,
we engage in a thought experiment. Suppose that there are two engineers, both of whom
are exemplars of moral and epistemic virtues. Wernher van Red and Walda van Green are
both working on the development of technology X. By being morally and epistemically
virtuous, van Red and van Green each practice admirably the moral virtue of care and the
epistemic virtue of curiosity. Technology X, which both are working on, has a number of
anticipated beneficial uses, A-D. However, there is one potential use of the technology, use
E, that would have severe moral consequences. Van Red makes an effort to anticipate the
uses and consequences of technology X. He considers uses A-D and he even can imagine
further uses F-H that are quite unlikely to be made of X. Van Red exercises care for the
people who might be affected by X and he is also curious to find out about the potential
further uses and consequences of X. Unfortunately, he is not very creative. Because of this,
van Red cannot imagine use E of X. He develops technology X, and it is used for E, which
has the effect of perpetuating the unfair treatment of a citizen group Z.
Walda van Green, on the contrary, is creative. She exercises care and is curious to the
same extent as van Red is. Thus, van Green also thinks about the uses and consequences of
X. She identifies A-D and can also think of F-H. However, because van Green is creative,
she can imagine use E. As a result, van Green does not develop technology X, which van
Red does develop. Instead, she develops technology X’, which is designed differently as a
result of anticipating use E and as a response to the concerns of citizen group Z. Her results
do not perpetuate the unfair treatment of citizen group Z, and for our little story to have a
happy ending, the bad outcome is prevented due to van Green’s poietic virtue of creativity.
6. Collective Virtues?
Up until now, we have considered the virtues in the classic sense of individual charac-
ter traits that are either possessed or not possessed by the individuals in question. However,
as our thought experiment implies, individuals do not develop technologies alone or as a
homogeneous group, and responsible innovation is a collective endeavor and thus not a
simple matter of there being single agents who are solely responsible [6].
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Let us therefore turn to an important objection against the proposed claim that virtues
are necessary to orient engineers and other technical experts towards the goals of the
governance frameworks. With respect to scientific inquiries there are objections to the
claim that epistemic virtues are necessary for scientific success. Cedric Paternotte and
Milena Ivanova [16] point out that, with the help of historical cases, that vices instead of
virtues promote certain successes in science. Their focus is constituted by questions about
which theory to choose in cases of insufficient evidence. It might be the case that a similar
objection could be run against our proposal. Isn’t it the case that particularly successful
technical experts are rather vicious instead of virtuous persons? In the case that such a
vicious person contributed to a project in responsible innovation, for example, wouldn’t
that be a counter example to our claim about the virtues being necessary for orienting the
goals of the governance frameworks?
If the virtues are to be considered only as character traits of individuals, then this
seems indeed to be a problem for the proposed account. However, if the virtues can be
understood to be somehow social, then one answer might start with the assumption that
a group of technical experts that contain vicious individuals might nevertheless count as
virtuous on a group level. Group virtues have been discussed in social philosophy, social
epistemology, and business ethics in terms of “group moral virtues,” “collective epistemic
virtues” and, in the case of creativity, “collective virtues” cf. [10–19,44,51]. Granted that
there are these group virtues, a reinterpretation of such a case involving vices could be
given. Some individuals may lack virtues and they may even be vicious, nevertheless, the
group they are in is still virtuously performing its function in the research and innovation
process. The focus is still on the micro-level and not on institutional mechanisms or
processes per se, but this focus is adjusted from the single considerations of individuals to
the social group that the individuals are part of.
A further question is how exactly to interpret such a group virtue. Is it, for example,
constituted by an aggregation of the virtues of the individuals, or is the group virtue in a
sense independent of the virtues of the individuals? While a full analysis of this important
question is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, we do note that Vincenzo Politi and
Alexei Grinbaum make a case for aggregate virtues by suggesting that a distribution of
virtue-ethical labor, in which only a subset of scientists and engineers possess or practice
the necessary virtues, is sufficient to ensure responsible innovation [23].
7. Conclusions
This paper proposed a hybrid interpretation of transformation research in the context
of normative governance frameworks, such as sustainable development, technology assess-
ment, and responsible innovation. We conducted a theoretical exposition of the capacities
that are found to be exercised by scientists, engineers, and other technical experts who
participated in prior empirical studies that employed STIR dialogues. Using the philosoph-
ical subfields of virtue epistemology, virtue ethics, and the philosophy of engineering we
identified three individual virtues thought to be consistently present during successful
modulations of research and innovation pathways. Additionally, we found that each of
these three individual virtues belongs to a separate kind of virtues. We thus sought to
contribute both to the fields of epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of technology, as
well as to the practical design and assessment of projects and programs intended to bring
about good results of transformation research that require the virtuous participation of
scientists, engineers, and other technical experts.
According to the proposed philosophical-reflective approach that studies patterns of
transformation processes on the micro level, virtues are forms of excellence that scientists,
engineers, and other technical experts need in order to foster socially and environmentally
responsible change. In other words, transformation research requires integrative experts
who possess and exercise integrative virtues. While this paper did not address the question
of how to exercise these virtues, it did identify not only the virtues but also the kinds of
virtues that policies, organizations, and projects should seek to cultivate.
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The proposed hybrid approach of transformation research emphasized the role of
philosophical reflection as a way to cultivate these virtues among such technical experts.
Results from the STIR studies suggested the importance of three particular character traits
among such technical experts who, in accordance with the injunction plus respicere, did in
fact “take more into account” as a result of reflective dialogues. Accordingly, we catego-
rized these traits into three distinct kinds of virtues. Aside from the theoretically accepted
categories of moral and epistemic virtues, we stressed the importance of poietic virtues
among the necessary attributes of agents involved in transformational activities. Our
analysis has implications not only for the implementation of the mentioned governance
frameworks and for the management of transformation research projects, but it also may
have implications for scientific and engineering educational curricula, engineering associa-
tion codes of conduct, and the design and implementation of industrial programs in, e.g.,
ethical and responsible AI. In short, moral virtues cannot be exercised in isolation from
either epistemic or poietic virtues; rather, all three must be exercised in an integrated man-
ner. Moreover, these integrated virtues must be exercised not merely as isolated individual
character traits but at more aggregate social levels.
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